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Abstract
In this paper, we focus on how European economic integration has affected the
synchronization and the magnitude of business cycles among participating coun-
tries. We measure, based on bandpass filtered data, the characteristics of European
business cycles analyzing to what extent they have become more similar over time.
We also consider the role of other factors such as differences in fiscal and mone-
tary policy, border effects, and trade intensity. Our main finding is that European
business cycles are highly synchronized, although we also find that synchronization
was higher during periods with highly flexible exchange rates. In addition we find
a positive tradeoff between timing and magnitude such that more synchronization
coincides with larger relative magnitude. These results raise concern about the
consequences of a common monetary policy within EMU.
JEL Classification: E32, F15
Keywords: Business cycles; symmetry and co–movement of cycles, magnitude of
cycles, economic integration, monetary union.
1 Introduction
Linkages between European countries have become more prevalent in the postwar period
as a result of the efforts of integrating national markets. These efforts include the removal
∗I have received valuable comments from Marianne Baxter, Lars Jonung, Katarina Juselius, Finn
Østrup, Clas Wihlborg, seminar participants at Lund University, University of Copenhagen and confer-
ence participants at the 4th Eurostat and DG ECFIN Colloquium on Modern Tools for Business Cycle
Analysis, the 6th Swedish Network for European Studies in Economics and Business conference on Euro-
pean Economic Integration in Swedish Research and the ECFIN Research Conference “Business Cycles
and Growth in Europe”. Financial support from the Swedish Research Council is gratefully acknowledged.
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of trade barriers, the implementation of the Single European Act in 1986, the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992, the introduction of the Single European Market in 1993, the Stability
and Growth Pact in 1997, and the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union with a
common currency and monetary policy. An important question is whether these efforts of
economic and monetary integration have led to a higher degree of similarity of European
business cycles in recent years.
Such a development is also desirable since the loss of the option of using an inde-
pendent monetary policy and giving up the value of changing the exchange rate when
desired would otherwise constitute a major cost for the EMU countries. These options
are especially important if countries are facing asymmetric shocks, in which case exchange
rate adjustments and separate monetary policies could help to stabilize nation–specific
aggregate fluctuations. A common monetary policy therefore requires that the timing of
business cycles is similar among the members of the monetary union. However, even if the
timing of business cycles is similar, the magnitude may differ, in which case the intensity
of policies may have to be different. Therefore, a common monetary policy requires that
business cycles in member states are highly synchronized and have small differences in
the magnitude.
There are theoretical reasons for both the view that economic integration will lead
to more synchronized business cycles and the opposite view that increased economic in-
tegration will lead to less synchronized business cycles. Kalemli–Ozcan, Sørensen and
Yosha (2001) argue that increased economic integration leads to better income insurance
through greater capital integration which in turn will lead to a more specialized produc-
tion structure and an increase in trade and therefore less synchronized business cycles. A
similar argument, although using different mechanisms, has also been proposed by Krug-
man (1993). Alternatively, it could be argued, as Coe and Helpman (1995) and Frankel
and Rose (1998) suggest, that the removal of trade barriers will lead to more trade such
that demand shocks are more easily transmitted across national borders. Economic and
monetary integration, will according to this view, lead to more symmetry of structural
shocks and knowledge and technology spillovers which will lead to a higher degree of
synchronization of national business cycles.
Given these theoretical ambiguities over the effects of economic and monetary inte-
gration on the behavior of business cycles, empirical evidence must be brought to bear
on the issue. Indeed, there are several papers suggesting that business cycles are more
synchronized when exchange rate variability is low (Fata´s (1997), Artis and Zhang (1997,
1999), Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1998) and Rose and Engel (2002)). However,
there are also papers suggesting the opposite, that business cycles are more synchronized
during periods with higher exchange rate volatility (Gerlach (1988), Inklaar and De Haan
(2001) and De Haan, Inklaar and Sleijpen (2002)). A few authors report evidence sug-
gesting no relationship between exchange rate regime and business cycle synchronization
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(Baxter and Stockman (1989), Sopraseuth (2003), Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004)).1 In
addition, there seems to be at most only weak evidence supporting the view that increased
economic integration leads to a higher degree of synchronization. Indeed, Doyle and Faust
(2002) and Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) find no strong evidence supporting this idea
whereas Imbs (2003) supports the view that financial liberalization is significantly related
to a higher degree of synchronization.
One approach in the literature is to distinguish between core and periphery European
countries, where the core countries have highly synchronized business cycles. Countries
identified as core EU have closer links and are expected to benefit from the common
monetary policy and the common currency without sacrificing national macroeconomic
stabilization objectives. On the other hand, countries identified as in the periphery are
not expected to gain from being members of a monetary union. There is a large literature
attempting to classify European countries into a core and a periphery, see, e.g., Artis
and Zhang (1997,1999), Artis, Kontolemis and Osborn (1997), Christodoulakis, Dimelis
and Kollintzas (1995), and Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1998). These studies vary
in their classification but a general result is that the long–standing members of the EU
often are classified as being in the core with Germany as an attractor. Camacho, Quiro´s
and Saiz (2004), however, cannot find strong evidence supporting the core/periphery
distinction and suggest that there is no distinct euro economy attractor. They also show
that European business cycles have become less synchronized after the establishment of
the EMU, a result that raises concern about the future of EMU.
With few exceptions, earlier papers focus on the relationship between exchange rate
regimes and the timing of European business cycles disregarding any effects of the mag-
nitude of cycles.2 This is in part surprising since there is a direct relationship between
the correlation and the variance. For example, holding everything else constant, a lower
variance would imply a higher correlation coefficient. Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos
(1998) find that the magnitude of business cycles in general is lower for core EU countries
but they provide no analysis of the relationship between magnitude and exchange rate
regimes. Sopraseuth (2003), however, found that the magnitude of European business
cycles was unrelated to membership of the EMS.
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the question whether European busi-
1Baxter and Stockman (1989) found that synchronization and monetary regimes were unrelated for
linear trend adjusted data but not for first log difference data where synchronization was higher when
exchange rate volatility was low. Sopraseuth (2003) also found that even though membership of the
EMS did not result in a higher degree of synchronization, business cycles in EMS countries became more
synchronized to the German cycle and less synchronized to the US cycle.
2The literature usually focuses on the G–7 countries documenting shifts in the volatility and in the
synchronization of cycles, see e.g. Doyle and Faust (2002), van Dijk, Osborn and Sensier (2002) and Stock
and Watson (2003). The consensus from this literature is that the business cycle has been dampened
recently but there is disagreement on the number of shifts, the dates of the breaks and the magnitude of
these breaks.
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ness cycles have become more similar as a result of economic and monetary integration.
We measure, based on bandpass filtered data, the characteristics of European business
cycles analyzing to what extent they have become more synchronized over time and test
whether, for example, EU membership and the Single Market program can account for
a higher degree of synchronization. We then consider the role of other factors that have
received considerable attention in the literature such as differences in fiscal and mone-
tary policy, border effects, and trade intensity. Can these factors explain the lack of full
synchronization among European business cycles?
Next, we turn our attention to the relative magnitude of national business cycles
and the question whether the amplitude of business cycles across Europe has become
more similar over time. Finally, we consider the linkage between synchronization and the
relative magnitude of business cycles.
The paper extends the earlier literature in at least two different directions. First, we
consider the role of exchange rate fluctuations in two ways, by decomposing the sample
into sub–samples reflecting different exchange rate regimes and by considering the direct
role of exchange rate volatility on the degree of synchronization. Second, we analyze
the tradeoff between synchronization or the timing of business cycles and the relative
magnitude of business cycles. This is particularly important from a European perspective
since the success of the common monetary policy and the common currency in Europe
rests on the similarity of both the timing and the magnitude of business cycles in member
states.
The paper is organized in the following manner. In section 2 we describe the method
used to extract the business cycle component from the data and perform a first preliminary
analysis of the data. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis. Section 4 summarizes the
main findings.
2 Methodology
2.1 Data
The data set consists of quarterly observations on industrial production for the EU–
14 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and five non–EU
countries (Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland and the US) for the sample 1961:1 to
2001:4.3 The data are taken from IFS CD–Rom except for industrial production for
Ireland and Portugal that have been taken from OECD Main Economic Indicators, see
Appendix A.
3We use industrial production as our business cycle indicator rather than GDP since quarterly GDP
data for all these countries is only available for a shorter sample period making it difficult to study
changes in business cycle behavior over time.
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2.2 Measuring domestic business cycles
Prior to our empirical analysis we must extract the cyclical component from the macro-
economic time series, i.e., the natural logarithm of industrial production. Recently, Baxter
and King (1999) have developed a bandpass filter that isolates cyclical components of eco-
nomic time series. This filter can be designed to isolate cyclical components of economic
time series conforming to a certain definition of business cycles.4 In particular, we isolate
cyclical components of the data with durations conforming to the Burns–Mitchell defini-
tion of the business cycle.5 We use a 12–order two–sided filter following Baxter and King
(1999) to extract all fluctuations at frequencies between 6 and 32 quarters (1.5 year and
eight years) from the logarithm of industrial production in each country.6 When applying
this filter, we lose observations at both ends of our sample. We use forecasts and backcasts
based on a twelfth order univariate autoregressive model to add these observations to the
sample prior to applying the bandpass filter. This same method is used by Stock and
Watson (1999) and Bergman, Bordo and Jonung (1998) amongst others.
In Appendix B, we show plots of the extracted business cycles as well as plots of
the raw data and the implied trend, i.e., the difference between the actual data and the
cyclical component. A striking feature of these graphs is the regularity of national business
cycles and the co–movements of downturns and upturns, in particular between the EU–14
countries. The overall impression is that cyclical fluctuations in industrial production in
this sample of countries display a relatively high degree of synchronization. It is also
interesting to note that the severity of business cycles has declined in the latter part of
our sample for some countries (Denmark, France and Greece) while the amplitude seems
to be relatively unchanged over time for other countries. The effects of the oil price shock
during the second half of the 1970’s and in the beginning of the 1980’s are also evident
for most countries as are the banking and currency crises in Finland and Sweden in the
early 1990’s.
3 Empirical work
3.1 Country–specific co–movements
In Figure 1 we study the co–movements between EU–14 and non–EU countries and the
co–movements between EU–14 countries before and after the particular country became
4Baxter and King (1999) compare the properties of cyclical components of US GNP generated by
different detrending techniques and find that the bandpass filter usually is superior to other filters in
isolating cyclical variation within certain frequency bands.
5They define business cycles as recurrent, but not strictly periodic, fluctuations in economic activity
with a duration usually between one and ten years, the average length varying over time.
6The results below are essentially unaffected when using the Hodrick–Prescott filter to extract the
business cycle component of industrial production instead of the Baxter–King filter.
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a member of the EU. To construct the graph in the upper panel we use the full sample
and compute the average of bilateral contemporaneous cross–correlation between EU–14
and non–EU countries for each country in our sample, i.e., the average of the cross–
correlations between, say, Germany and each European country and between Germany
and the five non–EU countries. On the vertical axis we measure cross–correlations with
non–EU countries whereas we measure cross–correlations with EU–14 countries on the
horizontal axis. As can be seen in this graph, there is a tendency that business cycles
in non–EU countries are more correlated to business cycles in non–EU countries than to
business cycles in the EU–14 countries with the exception of Austria and Switzerland.
The EU–14 countries seem to be more correlated to other EU–14 countries. However, the
differences are not substantial according to this plot.
The lower graph in Figure 1 shows the average of contemporaneous cross–correlations
between EU member states excluding the six original members prior to (vertical axis) and
after (horizontal axis) the particular country became a member of the EU. There is no
clear–cut pattern evident in this graph. Some countries have become more correlated to
other EU–countries after entering the EU (Ireland and the UK) while business cycles in
other countries were more synchronized prior to their EU–membership (Austria, Greece
and Portugal). Again there is no uniform evidence pointing in any particular direction for
these nine countries. The graphs in Figure 1 suggest that business cycles in the EU–14
countries are somewhat more synchronized to business cycles in other EU–14 countries
than with non–EU countries whereas EU membership seems to have had only marginal
effects on the degree of synchronization for most European countries.
3.2 Has the degree of synchronization changed over time?
It may well be the case that the degree of synchronization has changed over time and
that these changes are related to other developments than the timing of EU–membership,
for example, the exchange rate regime. Therefore we now divide our sample into five
sub–samples reflecting different monetary regimes and different degrees of economic in-
tegration: the Bretton–Woods period 1961:1–1973:1, the flexible exchange rate regime
1973:2–1978:4, the EMS period 1979:1–1987:2, the implementation of the Single Euro-
pean Act and the hard ERM period 1987:3–1992:4, and the implementation of the com-
mon market and preparations for monetary union 1993:1–2001:4.7 In addition, we will
from now on focus on the general pattern, i.e., we distinguish between groups of coun-
tries instead of differences between countries. This allows us to distinguish between EU
member states, non–EU member states and the role played by the monetary regime and
7It would have been interesting to divide the last period into two sub–periods allowing us to also study
the effects of EMU. This is, unfortunately, not possible since our estimates of co–movements would be
highly uncertain given the few available observations on industrial production and other variables used
in the analysis below for the EMU–period. The sub–samples we use roughly correspond to the ones used
in the earlier literature.
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Figure 1: Cross–correlations.
(a) Average cross–correlation with EU and non–EU countries.
(b) Average cross–correlation with EU countries before and after EU
membership.
Note: The average cross–correlations for non–EU countries shown in subfigure 1(a) are computed using
the full sample whereas the cross–correlations for EU countries are computed using data when they are
members of the EU. In subfigure 1(b) we show the average cross–correlation between a EU country and
other EU member states before and after the particular country entered the EU.
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the degree of economic integration.
In Table 1 we present the average cross–correlations between all countries, between
EU–14 countries, between non–EU countries and finally between EU–14 and non–EU
countries for the full sample and the five sub–samples. To measure these averages, we first
compute the bilateral cross–correlations between country i and j (ρij) for each sub–sample
and stack the unique cross–correlations in the vector ρ. This leads to a vector with 855
unique cross–correlations for the 19 countries (for each sample we have 19(19−1)/2 unique
cross–correlations). The average of cross–correlations between, say, the EU–14 countries
over the full sample is then a linear combination of these unique cross–correlations of the
form ρ = δ′ρ. To measure the standard error of these averages we use the Newey–West
heteroscedastic and autocorrelated corrected variance estimator (HAC).8
Looking first at the first row of Table 1 where we report estimates of the average cross–
correlations (ρ) for all countries. As can be seen from this row, the point estimates of the
degree of synchronization change over time, it is highest during the flexible exchange rate
period and lowest during the Bretton–Woods period. There is also a clear cycle in the
degree of synchronization. It is increasing between the first two sub–samples, decreasing
during the next two and then finally increasing again.
This pattern is also evident in the next row reporting the average cross–correlations
between EU member states, (ρEUMEUM). These averages are based on the sample of countries
that were members of the EU during the particular sub–sample, Denmark and Ireland
joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain joined in 1986 whereas Austria, Finland
and Sweden joined in 1995.9 The synchronization of business cycles between EU–member
states are highest during the flexible exchange rate period and higher during the most
recent period compared to the earlier two sub–samples.
A different pattern is evident for the sample of non–EU member states. Note that
these cross–correlations (ρNEUNEU) are computed for all countries that were not members of
the EU during the particular sub–sample. For these countries we observe a downward
trend (according to the point estimates) in the degree of synchronization over time. As
for the earlier two groups of countries, business cycles were strongly synchronized during
the flexible exchange rate period.
In the last row of the upper part of Table 1 we show the estimates of the average
degree of synchronization between EU–member states and non–EU member states (ρNEUEUM).
8It may be the case that the cross–correlations in ρ are correlated, the cross–correlation between
Sweden and Belgium and between Sweden and Denmark is correlated to the cross–correlation between
Denmark and Belgium. This potential problem gives rise to autocorrelated residuals. Following the
practice in the related literature we estimate the parameters using OLS and the standard errors using a
robust estimator.
9Our five sub–samples do not fully correspond to the dates when these countries joined the EU. In our
empirical work we, therefore, include Greece in our sample of EU countries in the sub–sample 1978–87,
Portugal and Spain in the sub–sample 1987–1992 and Austria, Finland and Sweden in the last sub–sample
1993–2011. Our empirical results are essentially unaffected by these assumptions.
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Table 1: Average cross–correlations in EU and non–EU countries.
Panel A: Average cross–correlations.
1961–2001 1961–1973 1973–1978 1979–1987 1987–1992 1993–2001
ρ 0.455 0.327 0.646 0.493 0.333 0.478
(0.018) (0.031) (0.037) (0.033) (0.029) (0.038)
ρEUMEUM 0.543 0.300 0.824 0.517 0.345 0.567
(0.028) (0.174) (0.026) (0.040) (0.064) (0.030)
ρNEUNEU 0.409 0.333 0.552 0.464 0.322 0.319
(0.031) (0.029) (0.061) (0.081) (0.084) (0.192)
ρEUMNEU 0.440 0.323 0.647 0.498 0.332 0.386
(0.024) (0.044) (0.051) (0.039) (0.036) (0.069)
Panel B: Wald tests.
H0: ρ
EUM
EUM = ρ
NEU
NEU 10.373 0.035 16.559 0.353 0.052 1.620
0.001 0.852 0.000 0.553 0.820 0.203
H0: ρ
EUM
EUM = ρ
EUM
NEU 8.801 0.022 10.438 0.138 0.028 5.790
0.003 0.882 0.001 0.710 0.868 0.016
Note: In Panel A we report the average of bilateral contemporaneous cross–correlations for all countries
(ρ), the average of contemporaneous cross–correlation between EU member states (ρEUMEUM), the average
of contemporaneous cross–correlations between non–EU member states (ρNEUNEU), and the average of con-
temporaneous cross–correlations between EU member states and non–EU members (ρEUMNEU ). Newey–West
HAC standard errors are shown in parentheses below each cross–correlation. In Panel B we report Wald
tests of the null hypothesis that the cross–correlation between EU and non–EU countries is equal (H0:
ρEUMEUM = ρ
NEU
NEU) and Wald tests of the null hypothesis that the cross–correlation between EU member
states is equal to the cross–correlations between EU member states and non–EU member states (H0:
ρEUMEUM = ρ
EUM
NEU ). These tests are χ
2 distributed with 1 degree of freedom. The total number of unique
cross–correlations is 855.
– 9 –
The pattern is similar, but not as strong, as for the EU–member states. The degree of
synchronization seems to increase somewhat in the last sub–period 1993–2001 compared
to the earlier period.
Comparing the degrees of synchronization across groups of countries and across time,
we find an interesting pattern. In Panel B in Table 1 we report Wald tests of the null
hypothesis that the average cross–correlations across EU–members and across non–EU
members are equal during each sample. These tests reveal that the degree of synchroniza-
tion differs only during the flexible exchange rate period. This suggests again that the
degree of synchronization has changed in a similar way for these two groups of countries
over time. In the second row of Panel B, we test the null hypothesis that EU–member
states synchronization with other EU–members and non–EU members are equal for each
sample. These tests show that business cycles in EU–member states were more synchro-
nized business during the flexible exchange rate period and the most recent period of
deepening European integration.
The analysis above only shows the main tendencies of the data and cannot be used
to argue that the attempts to bring European countries closer to each other by the im-
plementation of the common market and the establishment of the monetary union have
made business cycles more synchronized in Europe. To answer such questions, we from
now on focus on the sample of EU–countries, that is we focus only on bilateral cross–
correlations between EU–14 countries during each sub–sample testing for an additional
EU membership effect and the role played by the monetary regime.
In Table 2 we report tests of the null hypothesis that sub–sample averages of cross–
correlations between EU–member states are equal. A striking feature of these results is
that the second sub–sample, the flexible exchange rate regime, stands out as different.
We strongly reject the null hypothesis that business cycle synchronization during this
sample is equal to the synchronization during all other sub–samples. These results support
our earlier finding that business cycles were more synchronized during this sub–sample
compared to the other four regimes.
It is commonly argued in the literature that flexible exchange rates tend to insulate
the national economy from demand type shocks, i.e., shocks affecting the business cycle.10
Our calculations lend support to this idea. Monetary regimes with less flexible exchange
rates tend to be associated with a lower degree of synchronization.
The results in Table 2 also suggest that the degree of synchronization during the most
recent sub–sample is significantly different from the co–movements during the period
when the Single European Act was implemented. In this regard, it may be argued that a
deepening of European integration has led to a higher degree of synchronization although
business cycles were even more synchronized during the earlier flexible exchange rate
10Within a Mundell–Fleming model it is possible to show that flexible exchange rates insulate the
economy to aggregate demand shocks but not to money demand shocks. For a large open economy with
an inflation target, a fixed exchange rate regime is optimal.
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Table 2: Wald tests of EU membership effects across different monetary regimes.
1973–1978 1978–1987 1987–1992 1993–2001
1961–73 Wald 9.045 1.512 0.061 2.336
p–value 0.003 0.219 0.805 0.126
1973–78 Wald 43.222 48.604 44.027
p–value 0.000 0.000 0.000
1978–87 Wald 5.303 1.052
p–value 0.021 0.305
1987–92 Wald 10.280
p–value 0.001
Notes: Wald tests are based on regressions with a constant and sub–sample dependent EU dummy
variables and the HAC covariance matrix estimator. The degree of freedom is 2 for all tests.
period. A Wald test of the null hypothesis that cross–correlations are equal across all five
subperiods strongly rejects the null, χ2 = 91.978 with p–value = 0.000 further supporting
the conclusion that the degree of synchronization has changed over time. This result is
consistent with the results provided by Massmann and Mitchell (2003) in particular but
also the large body of the literature suggesting changes in the degree of synchronization
across time.
Our analysis above suggests that the synchronization of business cycles among EU
member states is higher than among non–EU member states. In the next subsection we
turn to the question why we observe these changes in the degree of synchronization. What
could explain the apparent changes in synchronization? In particular, we are interested
in explaining why the degree of synchronization was so high during the period when the
European countries had flexible exchange rates. It is also interesting to test whether the
significantly higher degree of synchronization during the last period is explained by the
increased economic integration or if other factors explain this increase.
3.3 What accounts for the EU membership effect?
In this section we examine whether the EU membership effects identified above can be
explained by other factors affecting the European economies or if other developments have
led to an increase in the degree of synchronization. Following Clark and van Wincoop
(2001) who study the border effect on the synchronization of business cycles, we consider in
addition to a border effect, the role played by trade intensity, distance between countries,
the size of countries, differences in monetary and fiscal policy, exchange rate volatility
and the volatility of oil price changes.
We define trade intensity (following Frankel and Rose (1998)) as the natural logarithm
of the value of bilateral trade between two countries divided by sum of the value of total
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trade in both countries, i.e.,
wijt = ln
(
Xijt +Mijt
Xit +Mit +Xjt +Mjt
)
.
We then take the average of these trade intensities over the five sub–samples. The dis-
tance (D) between countries is measured as the great circle between largest cities in each
country according to Fitzpatrick and Modlin (1986).11 The size is measured as the nat-
ural logarithm of the product of real GDP per capita measured in current US$.12 To
account for differences in monetary and fiscal policy, we use the standard deviation of the
money market (or equivalent measures) interest rate differential (σr−r∗) and the standard
deviation of the budget deficit (as a percentage of GDP) differential (σD−D∗), respectively.
These measures imply that if the monetary policy (or the fiscal policy) in two countries
differs substantially over a certain time period, the standard deviation is high. The larger
discrepancy between monetary (and fiscal policy), the higher standard deviation. The
exchange rate volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the first log difference of
bilateral exchange rates (σ∆s). Finally, we use the standard deviation of oil price changes
(σ
∆oil) as an indicator of large common shocks affecting all countries at the same time.
Note that all these measures are bilateral and that we take the average of annual (and
monthly or quarterly) observations for each sub–sample. Data sources and sample ranges
are presented in Appendix A.
In Table 3 we show the role of these factors in explaining the synchronization of
business cycles within the EU–14 countries. All results are based on running the following
regression
ρ = α0 + α1EUM+Xβ + ε
where EUM is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if both countries are members of
the EU at the time we measure the cross–correlation, X includes the various variables
discussed above. When including trade and the policy variables, we estimate the regression
using instrumental variables as discussed below.
In the first column of Table 3 we report the estimated effect of EU membership. As we
already know from our earlier analysis, this parameter is significant and positive suggesting
that EU member states tend to have more synchronized business cycles compared to EU–
14 countries that were not members of the EU at the point in time we computed the cross–
correlation. The question now is whether this positive effect disappears when including
11We have also considered alternative measures of distance such as the distance in radians of the unit
circle between country centroids. The empirical results below are essentially unaffected when using this
measure.
12Another approach to measure size is to use the natural logarithm of the sum of population. In general,
the significance of the parameters associated to this measure of size was lower (although statistically
significant at conventional levels) compared to the significance of the log of the product of real GDP. All
other results were essentially unaffected.
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other variables in the regression. In other words, is this EU member effect robust or are
there other explanations to the increasing synchronization that we have observed above.
The second column in Table 3 reports the results when including border, distance
and size as additional explanatory variables besides the constant and the EU membership
dummy. As is evident, there is a very strong border effect. Bordering EU countries tend
to have more synchronized business cycles compared to non–bordering countries. This
result is consistent with evidence provided by Clark and van Wincoop (2001) who report
very strong border effects between France, Germany, Italy and the UK.
The distance between the countries seems to play no role in explaining synchronization,
the parameter is not significantly different from zero. The size effect is highly significant
suggesting that the size of the countries play an important role for explaining the degree
of business cycle synchronization. The cross–correlation between large countries tends to
be higher compared to cross–correlations between small countries. However, controlling
for border, distance and size has some effect on the importance of EU membership. The
coefficient drops from 0.090 to 0.062 and it is only statistically significant at the 10
percent level suggesting that border, distance and size explain parts of the co–movements
of business cycles in EU member states. The conclusion is that controlling for a border,
in particular, but also for size reduces the EU membership effect somewhat.
Next, we add trade intensity, differences in monetary and fiscal policies, exchange rate
volatility and the volatility of oil price changes to the regression. To avoid multicolinearity
between the regressors, we now exclude both border and distance from our regression.13
Since trade may be endogenous (as argued by Frankel and Rose (1998)) we estimate
the regression using instrumental variables. Countries that border usually trade more
and therefore have more synchronized business cycles. A similar argument holds for
distance, the longer the distance is between two countries, the more likely it is that the
volume of trade is smaller. At the same time, as argued by both Frankel and Rose (1998)
and Clark and van Wincoop (2001), countries with highly synchronized business cycles
are better candidates for currency unions, which in turn could increase trade. We use
instruments that often are used in gravity models: border, distance, linguistic distance,
and an interaction term equal to the product of size and distance.14
To instrument the policy variables and exchange rate volatility, we use the absolute
inflation differential, the sum of interest rates, the absolute difference between the ratios of
government spending to GDP and the sum of the ratios of government spending to GDP.
These same instruments were used in a similar context by Clark and van Wincoop (2001).
To test whether trade, the policy variables and exchange rate volatility are endogenous we
apply the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test. The result shown in the last row of Table 3 strongly
13Trade, border and distance are highly correlated, the correlation coefficients are above 0.6 between
trade and the other two variables.
14The explanatory power for trade in the first stage regression using these instruments is 0.68.
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Table 3: Testing the border effect, the role of EU–membership distance, size, trade and
economic policy. EU–14 countries.
Variable OLS IV IV
EUM 0.090 0.062 0.054
(0.036) (0.037) (0.044)
Border 0.170 0.000
(0.052)
Distance 0.019
(0.037)
Size 0.142 0.402
(0.065) (0.128)
wij 0.032
(0.016)
σr−r∗ 0.194
(0.052)
σD−D∗ −0.113
(0.072)
σ∆s −0.080
(0.069)
σ∆oil −0.041
(0.017)
Durbin–Wu–Hausman test 35.953
p–value 0.000
Notes: Estimates are based on regressions of the average bilateral cross–correlations on a constant
and the various variables shown in the table where wij is trade intensity, σr−r∗ denotes differences in
monetary policy, σD−D∗ is a measure of differences in fiscal policy, σ∆s is the standard deviation of
bilateral exchange rates and σ∆oil is the standard deviation of oil price changes. Instruments for trade
are border, distance, language and an interaction term of distance and size. The three policy variables
(σr−r∗ , σD−D∗ and σ∆s) are instrumented using the absolute inflation differential, the sum of interest
rates, the absolute difference between the ratios of government spending to GDP and the sum of the
ratios of government spending to GDP. HAC standard errors using 4 lags are shown in parentheses below
each parameter estimate. Estimates are based on 182 unique cross–correlations.
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suggests a rejection of the null hypothesis that these variables are not endogenous.15
The result when including these explanatory variables in the regression is shown shown
in the third column of Table 3. The parameter associated with the EU dummy is further
reduced and is not statistically different from zero. This suggests that the higher synchro-
nization of business cycles within EU can be explained by the variables we have included
in the regression, not by the fact that these countries are members of the EU.
Trade is positively related to the synchronization of business cycles. The reason why
the business cycle is more synchronized between EU member states is, according to these
estimates, that they trade more. A surprising result, however, is that the two policy vari-
ables (differences in monetary and fiscal policies) exert different influences on the degree
of synchronization. It is often assumed that more similar economic policy should to lead
to a higher degree of business cycle synchronization. Looking at the particular estimates
in Table 3, we find that larger differences in monetary policy and smaller differences in
fiscal policy implies a higher degree of synchronization. Differences in monetary policy is
statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level whereas fiscal policy is
statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level. These results are different from
the evidence presented by Clark and van Winccop (2001). In their empirical application,
policy variables were often found to be positively related to the degree of synchronization
but very seldom statistically significant.
The volatility in exchange rates is not significant. According to our estimates there
is no additional link between exchange rate volatility and the synchronization of business
cycles that are not already captured by our decomposition into sub–samples. This result
questions some earlier empirical evidence provided by, for example, De Haan, Inklaar and
Sleijpen (2002). They show that there is a positive relationship between exchange rate
volatility and business cycle synchronization. One possible explanation is that we also
include differences in both monetary and fiscal policy and the effect from oil price changes
in our regressions.
Experiments with alternative specifications reveal that the inclusion of differences in
monetary policy explain why exchange rate volatility is not statistically significant. In
regression excluding differences in monetary policy, exchange rate volatility is always sig-
nificant and the point estimate is positive such that more volatility is associated with
more synchronized cycles. Furthermore, when excluding the volatility of oil prices in our
regressions we also obtain a positive parameter on exchange rate volatility but with a t–
ratio slightly above 1. In a regression excluding differences in monetary and fiscal policy,
15Gruben, Koo and Millis (2002) find that this endogeneity hypothesis is rejected in regressions similar
to the ones we perform above. They suggest that instrumental variable regressions tend to overestimate
the effects from trade on synchronization and suggest that OLS estimates should be used instead. How-
ever, their results based on OLS are consistent with our finding that there is a significant relationship
between trade intensity and synchronization. Traistaru (2004), also studying the relationship between
synchronization and trade, rejects the null of no endogeneity, the same result as we obtain in our regres-
sions.
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exchange rate volatility is significantly and positively related to business cycle synchro-
nization. To these findings we may also add that the average exchange rate volatility for
EU member states during the five sub–samples is 1.032, 1.823, 1.487, 0.997 and 1.482,
respectively. There is, thus, a common pattern of synchronization and exchange rate
volatility, higher exchange rate volatility is associated with a higher degree of business
cycle synchronization for EU member states.
The volatility of oil price changes is negatively related to business cycle synchroniza-
tion. A higher volatility (larger fluctuations in oil prices) lead to less synchronization.
This result is somewhat surprising since oil price changes affect all countries at the same
time and represent common shocks. It is often argued that a larger variance in common
shocks relative to idiosyncratic shocks tend to increase the correlation. It may be the
case that more flexible exchange rates during the 1970’s compensated for the increased
volatility in oil price changes such that business cycles became more synchronized. This is
also confirmed in regressions of business cycle synchronization on the standard deviation
of oil prices allowing the effect to vary over sub–samples. In these regressions we find that
higher oil price volatility is associated with more synchronization, confirming the view
that common shocks tend to increase comovements in international business cycles. This
effect is also significant when adding sub–sample dependent exchange rate volatility.
The results shown in Table 3 cannot be used to draw inference about the importance
of economic integration as the parameters are not allowed to vary across different sub–
samples. It may well be the case that EU membership is important during, say, the
last sub–period where the European countries have become more integrated. To examine
whether this is the case, we now allow the EU membership dummy to vary across the
five sub–samples. We still assume, however, that the influence from other explanatory
variables is time invariant. The results from these estimates are shown in Table 4.
For comparison we have included in the first column estimates of sample dependent
EU membership effects taken from Table 1. What is immediately evident in this table
is that the parameter associated to EU membership tends to change very little for some
sub–samples whereas it changes considerably for other sub–samples. The effect of the EU
membership dummy variable changes considerably for the first two sub–samples but much
less for the last sub–sample. Controlling for trade, differences in economic policy, exchange
rate volatility and oil price volatility leads to a drop in the EU membership dummy
suggesting that synchronization is explained by trade in particular but also differences in
economic policy, see the last column of Table 4. Exchange rate and oil price volatility are
not statistically significant in these regressions.
Similarly to our earlier results presented earlier in Table 3, there is a strong border
effect and trade is always significant. This suggests that bordering countries that also
trade more, will have more synchronized business cycles compared to countries located far
away. The parameter associated with size is significantly different from zero all regressions.
Differences in monetary policy and fiscal policy are both significant and have parameters
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Table 4: Testing the border effect, the role of EU–membership distance, size, trade and
economic policy. EU–14 countries.
Variable OLS IV IV
EUM 1961–73 −0.152 −0.256 −0.329
(0.167) (0.155) (0.158)
EUM 1973–78 0.372 0.314 0.284
(0.037) (0.041) (0.054)
EUM 1979–87 0.065 0.024 0.069
(0.047) (0.047) (0.078)
EUM 1987–92 −0.107 −0.152 −0.203
(0.071) (0.066) (0.072)
EUM 1993–2001 0.115 0.098 0.095
(0.040) (0.038) (0.037)
Border 0.178
(0.045)
Distance 0.004
(0.035)
Size 0.123 0.371
(0.062) (0.120)
wij 0.034
(0.018)
σr−r∗ 0.167
(0.048)
σD−D∗ −0.137
(0.059)
σ∆s −0.069
(0.072)
σ
∆oil −0.039
(0.016)
Durbin–Wu–Hausman test 37.380
p–value 0.000
Notes: Estimates are based on regressions of the average bilateral cross–correlations on a constant
and the various variables shown in the table where wij is trade intensity, σr−r∗ denotes differences in
monetary policy, σD−D∗ is a measure of differences in fiscal policy, σ∆s is the standard deviation of
bilateral exchange rates and σ
∆oil is the standard deviation of oil price changes. Instruments for trade
are border, distance, language and an interaction term of distance and size. The policy variables are
instrumented using the absolute inflation differential, the sum of interest rates, the absolute difference
between the ratios of government spending to GDP and the sum of the ratios of government spending
to GDP. HAC standard errors using 4 lags are shown in parentheses below each parameter estimate.
Estimates are based on 182 unique cross–correlations.
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of approximately the same size regardless of whether we allow the EU membership dummy
to vary across sub-samples or not.
Looking more closely at the results for the flexible exchange rate regime, we find that
the effect of EU membership drops when adding the control variables. This suggests
that the control variables explain parts of the very high synchronization of business cy-
cles for this sub–sample. For the more recent sub–samples, the parameter changes very
little. We can, therefore, conclude that the various control variables cannot explain the
increased synchronization during this period. In this respect, the increased economic in-
tegration may have had a positive influence on business cycle synchronization. This result
is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Imbs (2003). He finds that financial
integration (no capital account restrictions and a high degree of risk–sharing) has a pos-
itive and significant effect on business cycle synchronization. Even if our measurements
are different from the measurements used by Imbs, our results and interpretations are
consistent.
Even though there is an upward trend in synchronization, we cannot draw any strong
conclusions about the future of European business cycle behavior. The reason is that
synchronization depends also on trade and differences in economic policy. The empirical
evidence on the relationship between exchange rate volatility and trade suggest that trade
possibly will increase in the future as a result of monetary union.16 In addition, our
results suggest that common fiscal policies also increase synchronization, the parameter
associated with the standard deviation of differences in budget deficits as percentage of
GDP is negative. Convergence of fiscal policies within the EMU may lead to a higher
degree of synchronization.
We also found a positive and significant effect between differences in monetary policy
and synchronization. If this result is robust, then the common monetary policy in Europe
runs the risk of increasing the divergence in business cycles counteracting the positive
effects from economic integration. It is, of course, an open question whether the trade
effect is stronger or weaker than the effect from differences in monetary policy. The
common monetary policy will tend to decrease synchronization whereas increased trade
intensity will tend to increase synchronization. If the former effect dominates, the common
monetary policy would be too expansive in some countries and too restrictive in others.
These potential problems will not occur to the same extent if the latter effect dominates.
In addition, our results that there is a weak positive relationship between exchange rate
volatility and business cycle synchronization. Our estimates cannot reveal how strong
this effect is, but periods with more flexible exchange rates coincide with periods with a
high degree of synchronization.
16Running a regression of trade on exchange rate volatility, we find a very strong and significant effect
implying that lower exchange rate volatility will tend to increase trade. This positive relationship has
also been found by, e.g., Rose and Engel (2002).
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3.4 The magnitude of business cycles
The analysis above shed some light on the timing of business cycles in the EU where
the main argument was that the implementation of a common monetary policy and the
synchronization of fiscal policy within the EU–area is a concern if the timing of business
cycles differs considerably. A similar argument holds for the magnitude of business cycles
as a common economic policy could lead to too small effects in countries with highly
variable cycles and too large effects in countries with less variable cycles. For countries
with similar amplitudes, a common economic policy raises no such concerns. In other
words, the intensity of economic policies has to differ among countries with different
amplitudes of its business cycles.
An analysis and comparison of the amplitude of business cycles and its consequences
for the common economic policy in Europe require a thorough analysis of each national
business cycle and its relation to business cycles in all other EU countries. In this subsec-
tion, however, we continue to study the average behavior in all EU countries. There are,
of course, many aspects that such analysis cannot capture, but it is nevertheless inter-
esting to study the main tendencies, in particular to establish whether the business cycle
amplitude has changed over time and if so, if these changes are related to the monetary
regime.
In the upper panel of Table 5 we report estimates of the absolute difference of the
standard deviation of national business cycles both for all EU–14 countries and for the EU
member states.17 According to these estimates, the amplitude for all EU–14 countries have
increased considerably over the sample from 0.6 to 0.95. This suggests that the magnitude
of business cycles were more similar during the Bretton–Woods period compared to all
other sub–samples we examine. This result does not fully carry over to EU member states.
According to the results shown in Panel A, differences in the amplitude for these countries
fell somewhat during the implementation of the Single European Act period compared to
the earlier EMS period.
In Panel B, we report formal tests of the hypothesis that the relative magnitude of
business cycles is equal across sub–samples.18 These results show that we can always
reject the null hypothesis of equal magnitudes when comparing the last sub–sample with
all other sub–samples at the 10% level. Based on this evidence, we conclude that the
bilateral differences of the magnitude are larger during the most recent sub–sample. A
test of the hypothesis that the average amplitude is constant over all samples is strongly
rejected, χ24 = 18.852 with p–value = 0.001 suggesting that the magnitude is not constant.
17There are other ways to measure the amplitude of business cycles, for example by using the mean
absolute deviation as suggested by Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1998). They report, however, that
their results were unchanged when they used the standard deviation as the measure of business cycle
amplitude as we use here.
18We only report results for EU member states in the table. We obtain similar results for the sample
of all EU–14 countries and these results are available upon request from the author.
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Table 5: Absolute difference between the standard deviation of the business cycle. EU–14
countries.
Panel A: Mean of absolute difference of standard deviations.
1961–2001 1961–1972 1973–78 1979–1987 1987–1992 1993–2001
EU–14 0.749 0.595 0.759 0.678 0.767 0.948
(0.031) (0.056) (0.091) (0.062) (0.043) (0.055)
EU members 0.792 0.682 0.717 0.682 0.575 0.948
(0.043) (0.132) (0.118) (0.074) (0.077) (0.055)
Panel B: Wald tests of equal differences in magnitude
for EU–members across monetary regimes.
1973–1978 1978–1987 1987–1992 1993–2001
1961–73 Wald 0.040 0.000 0.488 3.484
p–value 0.842 0.999 0.485 0.062
1973–78 Wald 0.065 1.014 3.160
p–value 0.799 0.314 0.075
1978–87 Wald 0.997 8.465
p–value 0.318 0.004
1987–92 Wald 15.325
p–value 0.000
HAC standard errors using 4 lags are shown in parentheses below each parameter estimate. Wald tests
are based on regressions with a constant and a EU dummy variable where all parameters are allowed
to vary across the sub–samples and the HAC covariance matrix estimator. Degrees of freedom is 2 for
all tests. A Wald test of the null hypothesis that cross–correlations are equal across all five subperiods
strongly reject the null, χ2 = 18.852 with p–value = 0.001. Estimates are based on 182 observations of
relative magnitudes.
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It is surprising that the relative magnitude of European business cycles tends to in-
crease, in particular, towards the end of our sample. Our results are, however, similar
to earlier empirical findings in the literature for the US and the G–7 countries. There
is a general consensus that the volatility of business cycle in these countries has been
dampened even though there is a debate on the date of the structural break in the ampli-
tude and, of course, whether there has been more than one structural break, see e.g. van
Dijk, Osborn and Sensier (2002), Doyle and Faust (2002) and Stock and Watson (2003).
Indeed, looking at the underlying data we use to compute the relative magnitudes, we
find that the volatility of the bandpass filtered data tends to be lower for the more recent
sub–samples for some countries compared to earlier periods. This can also be seen in the
plots of the bandpass filtered data in Appendix B.
How should we interpret our results that both the cross–correlations and the relative
magnitude have increased during the most recent period. First, we recognize that these
changes are related. Holding everything else constant, an increase in the volatility implies
a reduction in the co–movement of the two time series we examine. But how do increases
in economic integration or a higher degree of asymmetry of nation–specific shocks affect
these measures? To answer these questions it is informative to use the following model
that is also used by Doyle and Faust (2002). Assume for simplicity that we only study
two countries, home and foreign, and that the business cycle in each country is driven
by idiosyncratic shocks and common shocks. We also allow for a direct linkage between
the countries such that, say, the nation–specific foreign shocks are transmitted to the
home country. Let y be the measure of the business cycle, εh and εf are the idiosyncratic
shocks (they are assumed to be independent white noise sequences with variance σ2h and
σ2f respectively), εc is the common shock (also white noise with variance σ
2
c ) and 0 < γ < 1
is a parameter determining the linkages between the two countries. We can now write the
model in the following way
yh = εh + εc + γyf
yf = εf + εc + γyh.
We have used the simple correlation coefficient to measure co–movements and the ab-
solute value of the difference between the standard deviations of the cycles. Using the
model above to compute the variance of the business cycles in the two countries and the
covariance between the cycles, we obtain
Var (yh) =
(
− 1
γ2−1
)2 (
σ2h + γ
2σ2f + (1 + γ)
2 σ2c
)
Var
(
yf
)
=
(
− 1
γ2−1
)2 (
γ2σ2h + σ
2
f + (1 + γ)
2 σ2c
)
Cov
(
yh, yf
)
=
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)2 (
γ
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2
f
)
+ (1 + γ)2 σ2c
)
.
The correlation coefficient is therefore
ρhf =
γ
(
σ2h + σ
2
f
)
+ (1 + γ)2 σ2c√(
σ2h + γ
2σ2f + (1 + γ)
2 σ2c
) (
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2
f + (1 + γ)
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)
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and the relative magnitude is
| σh − σf |=|
σ2f − σ2h
γ2 − 1 | .
From these relationships we find that the correlation coefficient is increasing in γ the
parameter describing the spillover effect from one country to the other and the variance
of the common shock εc. Higher variance of the idiosyncratic shocks tends to reduce the
correlation between the cycles holding everything else constant. It is also evident that the
relative standard deviation of the two cycles is independent of the variance of the common
shock. Unless the idiosyncratic shocks are equal across the two countries, a higher value of
γ reduces the difference. If the spillover effect is stronger, the variance of the two business
cycles tends to be more equal. The only case when both the correlation and the relative
standard deviation increase is when the variance of the foreign idiosyncratic shock (σ2f )
is falling. This argument is consistent with recent empirical results provided by Stock
and Watson (2003) who showed that the increases in synchronization observed for G–7
countries could be explained by lower volatility in idiosyncratic shocks.
Our empirical analysis raises the question whether there is a tradeoff between co–
movements and the relative magnitude and also if there are differences between EU–
member states and European countries that were not members at the time we measure
these indicators. To shed some light on these questions, we run a regression with the
contemporaneous cross–correlations ρ as a function of a constant, the absolute difference
between standard deviations of national business cycles and the corresponding measure
for EU member states. It is important to notice that we are not discussing any causal
relationship between these variables, we are only interested in whether synchronization
and the relative magnitudes are correlated and if there is a difference between all EU
countries and EU member states. These regression results are shown in Panel A of Table
6. As can be seen from these estimates, we find a negative point estimate (although
not statistically significant) of the parameter associated to the absolute difference in the
magnitude. What is indeed surprising is that we also obtain a positive and significant point
estimate for EU members. According to this regression result, a lower absolute difference
in the magnitude is associated with a lower degree of business cycle synchronization for
EU members only.19
This result tends to be robust to changes in the specification of the regressions. The re-
sults do not change when we allow the tradeoff to be sample dependent or when we include
other explanatory variables. In Panel B, we allow the tradeoff to be sample dependent.
In the first two columns we report the results when allowing the tradeoff for all EU–14
countries to vary across sub–samples. In the second column, we also distinguish between
EU–14 and EU members. From these estimates, we find that the overall negative and
19Running a regression with cross–correlations on a constant and the relative magnitude, we find no
significant relationship. But as soon as we distinguish between EU–14 countries and EU members, we
obtain a positive and significant parameter.
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Table 6: Tradeoff between synchronization and magnitude.
Panel A: Tradeoff between synchronization and magnitude.
Dep.var. const | σi − σj | | σi − σj | .∗ EUM
ρ 0.489 −0.043 0.103
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
Panel B: Tradeoff between synchronization and magnitude. Dependent variable: ρ.
const 0.509 0.506 const 0.468 0.496
(0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.030)
| σi − σj | . ∗D1 −0.175 −0.182 | σi − σj | . ∗D1. ∗ EUM −0.150 −0.130
(0.068) (0.066) (0.196) (0.199)
| σi − σj | . ∗D2 0.097 0.080 | σi − σj | . ∗D2. ∗ EUM 0.299 0.324
(0.047) (0.048) (0.042) (0.045)
| σi − σj | . ∗D3 −0.032 −0.055 | σi − σj | . ∗D3. ∗ EUM 0.054 0.076
(0.034) (0.041) (0.043) (0.045)
| σi − σj | . ∗D4 −0.110 −0.124 | σi − σj | . ∗D4. ∗ EUM −0.112 −0.094
(0.041) (0.043) (0.074) (0.078)
| σi − σj | . ∗D5 0.048 −0.026 | σi − σj | . ∗D5. ∗ EUM 0.079 0.107
(0.030) (0.053) (0.028) (0.034)
| σi − σj | . ∗ EUM 0.076 | σi − σj | −0.050
(0.043) (0.032)
Panel C: Can policy variables explain the trade–off? Dependent variable ρ.
const | σi − σj | | σi − σj | .∗ EUM σr−r∗ σD−D∗ σ∆s σoil
0.494 −0.041 0.080 0.091 −0.251 0.050 0.008
(0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.068) (0.027) (0.010)
Note: EUM denotes a EU membership dummy variable, Di denotes a dummy variable for sub–sample i
and | σi − σj | is the absolute difference between the standard deviation of the business cycle in country
i and j. The policy variables and exchange rate volatility are instrumented using the absolute inflation
differential, the sum of interest rates, the absolute difference between the ratios of government spending
to GDP and the sum of the ratios of government spending to GDP. HAC standard errors using 4 lags
are shown in parentheses below each parameter estimate. Estimates are based on 182 observations of
relative magnitudes.
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significant relationship holds for two sub–samples, the Bretton–Woods period and dur-
ing the implementation of the Single European Act 1987–1992. For one sub–sample (the
flexible exchange rate period 1973–1978) we find a positive and significant relationship.
This result is not dependent on a distinction between EU–14 and EU members as can be
seen in the second column where we add the relative magnitude for EU member states.
The parameter associated to the relative magnitude between EU members is significant
at the 10% level and positive supporting our earlier result.
In the last two columns of Panel B in Table 6 we allow the tradeoff for EU members
to vary across sub–samples. In the first of these two columns we find that there is a
strong positive relationship during the flexible exchange rate period and the most recent
sub–sample. There is no significant tradeoff during the other three sub–samples according
to these estimates. This conclusion does not change if we include the magnitude for all
EU–14 countries in the regression with one exception. The parameter associated to the
tradeoff between EU members during the EMS period is positive and significant at the
10% level.
Our conclusion from these estimates is that there seems to be a positive tradeoff
between synchronization and the relative magnitude of business cycles for the EU member
states. A higher degree of synchronization is associated with larger differences in the
relative magnitude as the volatility of country–specific business cycles tends to be lower
in recent years for some EU member states and higher for other. A similar tradeoff is not
evident for European countries that are not members of the EU at the time of measurement
except for the second sub–sample with flexible exchange rates where the parameter is
positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, see the two first columns in Panel
B. This raises concern over the attempts of using a common monetary policy to stabilize
the European economies since it suggests that it is important to vary the intensity of the
policy.20 It is possible, of course, that national fiscal policies can be used to compensate
for differences in the intensity of the common monetary policy.
To answer the question of whether similarities in economic policy and whether the
exchange rate regime can explain the significant EU–membership effect, we run additional
regressions of the cross–correlations on a constant, the magnitude for all countries and
the magnitude for EU members adding measures of the difference in economic policy,
exchange rate volatility and oil price volatility. These results are shown in Panel C in
Table 6. We use the same instruments for the policy variables and exchange rate volatility
as in our earlier regressions. The overall impression from these tests is that the policy
variables cannot explain the positive tradeoff even though three of these control variables
are significant (differences in fiscal and monetary policy and exchange rate volatility).
20It may be the case that the different magnitudes are the result of differences in the transmission
of structural shocks. If that is the case and if the difference in the magnitude is solely attributable to
monetary policy shocks, then there is no problem, the European countries would only react differently to
the common monetary policy.
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The parameter associated with the relative magnitude in EU members do change (from
0.103 to 0.080) but is still significantly different from zero.
To interpret these empirical results and to be able to speculate about future develop-
ments and the consequences of the common monetary policy in Europe, we have to look
more closely at the exchange rate volatility we have measured for the five sub–samples.
For the EU member states, exchange rate volatility was highest during the flexible ex-
change rate period and the most recent period. It is also for these two sub–samples we
obtain a positive tradeoff between the relative magnitude and synchronization, the pa-
rameter is statistically significant at the 10% level. This implies that a higher degree
of exchange rate volatility is associated with more synchronization and larger differences
in the magnitude of the business cycle. If these relations are stable over time and over
different monetary regimes, then business cycles in EU member states will become less
synchronized but also display less differences in the magnitude which would constitute
a potential problem when implementing a common monetary policy and the common
currency.
4 Conclusions
It is widely argued that the success of the common currency area in Europe rests on
the uniformity of business cycle fluctuations. Our results suggest that European business
cycles are synchronized to a high degree but we also find that the degree of synchronization
has changed considerably since the early 1960s. In particular, we find that synchronization
is higher during periods with more flexible exchange rates and lower when exchange
rate volatility is low. These results question earlier findings that European business
cycles became more synchronized during the EMS period. Our evidence further suggests
that there are several contradicting forces affecting the degree of synchronization, smaller
differences in monetary policy leading to less synchronized cycles, smaller differences in
fiscal policy and increases in trade leading to more synchronization. In addition, there
may be positive relationship between exchange rate volatility and synchronization. As a
major objective of the EU is economic and monetary integration, one would anticipate
that the linkages should strengthen over time, maybe also offset the negative effects from
the common monetary policy (and lower exchange rate volatility).
When adding the analysis of the magnitude of European business cycles, the picture
becomes more complex. Our estimates suggest that differences in the magnitude of Euro-
pean business cycles have risen over time and have never been so large for EU members.
This result also raises concern about the common monetary policy as it is likely that the
policy will be too expansive for some member states and too restrictive for others. The
tradeoff between synchronization and differences in magnitude is positive such that larger
differences coincide with a higher degree of synchronization. If business cycles become
more synchronized and the relative magnitude less similar, then the timing of the common
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policy tends to be optimal but the intensity tends to be wrong for some member states.
A major objective of the EU is to foster stronger economic ties between members and
this process will tend to increase the degree of compatibility between the member states.
Whether this also leads to more synchronization and convergence of the amplitude of
the business cycle in member countries is an open question and cannot be answered by
looking at historical relationships. The analysis in this paper supports this view. We find
that business cycle behavior changes over time in response to new economic environments.
This point, which is a version of the Lucas critique, implies that it is not possible to draw
too strong policy conclusions from our empirical analysis. It may well be the case that
economic integration leads to more similar business cycles within the EMU area even
though our empirical analysis of historical data suggests the opposite.
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Appendix A: Data sources
Industrial production To measure business cycles we use quarterly observations of
industrial production taken from IFS for all countries except for Ireland and Portugal
where the data is extracted from OECD Main Economic Indicators. All data are
seasonally adjusted. Sample range is 1961:1–2001:4 for all countries except Belgium
1961:4–2000:4, Denmark 1968:1–2001:4 and Switzerland 1965:1–2001:4. Estimates
of bilateral cross–correlations use all data available for each pair of countries.
Trade Annual bilateral trade statistics are obtained from IMF Direction of Trade Statis-
tics. Sample range is 1961–2001.
Interest rates The following interest rates are used to measure differences in monetary
policy over the sample 1980–2001: Austria – money market rate; Belgium – call
money rate; Canada – overnight money market rate; Denmark – call money rate;
Finland – average cost of CB debt; France – call money rate; Germany – call money
rate; Greece – central bank rate; Ireland – exchequer bills; Italy – money market
rate; Japan – call money rate; Netherlands – call money rate; Norway – call money
rate; Portugal – up to 5 days interbank deposit; Spain – call money rate; Sweden
– call money rate; Switzerland – money market rate; United Kingdom – overnight
interbank rate; United States – Federal funds rate. For the period 1961–1979 we
use discount rates taken from IFS except for Greece where we use central bank rate.
All data are quarterly.
Consumer price index We use quarterly observations of the consumer price index
taken from IFS to compute annual inflation.
Budget deficit as a fraction of GDP Annual data on net lending as a fraction of
GDP for the European countries, Japan and the US during the period 1970–2001
are obtained from European Economy Tables 78A linked to data from Table 78B.
Data for the period 1960–69 are obtained from IFS. Data for other non–European
countries are taken from IFS. The sample range is 1961–2001 except Japan and
Portugal 1970–2001.
Exchange rate volatility Monthly nominal exchange rates are obtained from IFS. Sam-
ple range is 1961:1–2001:4. Exchange rate volatility is measured as the average of
log first difference of bilateral exchange rates.
Government expenditure as a fraction of GDP Annual observations of government
expenditure and nominal GDP are obtained from IFS. The sample ranges are: Aus-
tria and Belgium 1961–98, Canada 1961–2000, Denmark 1961–1999, Finland 1961–
1998, France 1972–1997, Germany 1961–1998, Greece 1961–1999, Ireland 1961–1999,
Italy 1961–98, Netherlands 1961–98, Norway 1961–98, Portugal 1970–98, Spain
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1962–99, Sweden 1961–2000, Switzerland 1961–2001, United Kingdom 1961–99,
United States 1961–2001.
GDP per capita Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita measured in current US$
taken from Penn World Table 6.1 (CGDP). The sample range is 1960–2000.
Distance Distance between two locations is measured as the great circle between largest
cities in each country according to Fitzpatrick and Modlin (1986).
Linguistic distance This measure ranges from 0 (nobody speaks the same primary lan-
guage in the two countries) to 10000 (everybody speaks the same primary language)
taken from Boisso and Ferrantino (1997). Note that we have updated this series
such that the primary language in the three Nordic countries Denmark, Norway and
Sweden is identical (the language variable is 10000). The reason for this is that the
language spoken in the three Nordic countries essentially is the same. In addition we
let the language variable between Finland and the three Nordic countries be equal
to the measure of identical primary language between Finland and Sweden (600).
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